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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PETE FLOOR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040779-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* ik Jc 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
2003), and possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Were police officers required to wait before entering defendant's residence where: 
(1) the front door had already been opened by defendant's wife, (2) she stood at the door 
conversing with the officers, (3) the officers then identified themselves and announced their 
purpose to serve a search warrant, and (4) she took a step back into the residence? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 
2004 UT 94, f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State 
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 1 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (West 2004) 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical 
harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
After the execution of a search warrant on defendant's home, the State charged 
defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, 
2 
endangerment of a child, a third degree felony, and possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony. R. 1-5. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that the officers "failed to knock and announce their 
presence and wait a reasonable time prior to entering the house and seizing the evidence." R. 
42-53. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. R. 
65-66,71 -75,129. Defendant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to a reduced charge 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony. R. 76-85. Defendant reserved the right 
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 76. The trial court sentenced 
defendant to two concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years, suspended the sentences, and 
placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months. R. 93-95. Defendant obtained a 
stay of the sentence and filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 109-10, 113-14. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS1 
On November 11, 2003, Detectives Doug Teerlink and Steve Cutler approached the 
front door of defendant's residence to serve a "knock-and-announce" search warrant. R. 
129: 4-5, 8, 16-17 (R. 71: ^ 1-2). Meanwhile, eight members of the narcotics squad—all 
dressed in clearly marked raid gear—secretly positioned themselves in the driveway just 
south of the door. R. 129: 5,9-10,25-26 (R. 71: If 2). As the two officers ascended the steps 
1
 Because "[s]earch and seizure cases are 'highly fact dependant,5" the appellate court 
supplements the trial court's factual findings "with relevant, objective facts gleaned from 
testimony given during the evidentiary hearing" on the motion to suppress. Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 2005 UT 13, \ 1 n.l, (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 2, 78 P.3d 590). 
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to the door, they observed through the glass storm door a female—later identified as Connie 
Bamett—standing just inside the residence. R. 129: 5. Defendant stood just behind her. R. 
129: 6.2 
Apparently believing that the two officers, who were both wearing plain clothes, were 
simply there about her missing dog, Bamett pushed open the storm door, stood in the 
doorway, and asked, "Are you here about my lost dog?" or words to that effect. R. 129: 5-6, 
10-12, 17 (R. 72: ^ f 3). Rather than immediately identifying themselves as police serving a 
search warrant, Detective Cutler briefly discussed her lost dog. R. 129: 12, 17 (R. 72:14). 
After some fifteen seconds of conversation about the dog, Detective Cutler pulled out his 
police badge and Detective Teerlink announced, "Police, Salt Lake City Police serving a 
search warrant." R. 129: 6, 12-13, 17, 19 (R. 72: % 4). Upon the announcement, the rest of 
the narcotics team came forward. R. 129: 11-13, 27. 
When Detective Teerlink made the announcement, Bamett began "backing up into the 
residence." R. 129: 6 (R. 72: ^ f 4). Detective Teerlink grabbed Bamett by the arm to prevent 
2
 Defendant asserts that "[b]oth detectives testified that they first noticed [him] after 
Det. Teerlink had entered the house and grabbed Connie." Aplt. Brf. at 16 (emphasis 
defendant's). That claim is not supported by the record. After Detective Teerlink testified 
that Bamett retreated upon the officers' announcement, the prosecutor asked whether 
"anybody else [was] there with her or around." R. 129: 6. Detective Teerlink then indicated 
that defendant was there. R. 129: 6. Detective Cutler testified that defendant was "maybe 
two feet or a couple steps behind her" when he stepped forward and tried to pull her back 
into the residence. R. 129:17. Neither indicated whether they saw defendant before or after 
Detective Teerlink grabbed Bamett. However, where they stood talking to Bamett through 
an open door for some fifteen seconds and defendant was no more than two feet behind her, 
it can be fairly inferred that the officers could see him as they spoke with Bamett. 
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her from retreating further into the house and destroying evidence or securing a weapon. R. 
129:7,13, 17-18 (R. 72:ffi[4,6). When he did so, defendant stepped up to Barnett, grabbed 
her around the waist, and began pulling her back into the residence. R. 129: 7-8,15, 17,22, 
27 (R. 72: If 4). Detective Cutler then grabbed Detective Teerlink to keep him from being 
pulled inside, but let go when the rest of the squad came up the stairs to execute the warrant. 
R. 129: 18-19, 27 (R. 72: ^ 5). When he did so, Barnett fell back into the residence, and 
Detective Teerlink fell forward into the residence. R. 129: 15, 19. 
The rest of the squad followed them in while the lead officer yelled, "Police, Police, 
Police." R. 129: 11-12, 14-15, 27-29 (R. 72: If 7). The lead officer grabbed defendant and 
pushed him back to make room for his squad's entry into the house, and he was bitten by a 
dog in the process. R. 129: 27-29 (R. 72: f 7). Meanwhile, Detective Teerlink secured 
Barnett in handcuffs. R. 129: 15. No property was damaged during the police entry into the 
residence. R. 129: 15, 23, 29 (R. 72: f 8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal turns on whether the officers were required to further delay their entry 
into defendant's house after his wife opened the door and the officers announced their 
authority and purpose. They were not. Where the door was open and the occupant was 
made aware of the officers' authority and purpose, the objectives served by the knock-and-
announce rule were achieved. Defendant's privacy interests were protected, violence 
resulting from surprise was averted, and the door was saved. 
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ARGUMENT 
ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S HOUSE AFTER HIS WIFE OPENED 
THE DOOR AND POLICE ANNOUNCED THEIR AUTHORITY AND 
PURPOSE WAS REASONABLE AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Defendant asserts that "[b]ecause the police immediately entered [his] residence 
without waiting for him or Connie [Barnett] to respond, their entry was only justified if they 
had a reasonable suspicion of danger, futility, or the destruction of evidence." Aplt. Brf. at 
15. He contends that Barnett's step backwards did not portend a threat to the officers or the 
destruction of evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 15-24. He argues that the officers' failure to wait thus 
requires suppression. Aplt. Brf. at 24-32. Defendant's claim, however, rests on the premise 
that the officers "fail[ed] to wait a reasonable time before entering [his] residence." Aplt. 
Brf. at 13. Because this premise is erroneous, defendant's claim fails.3 
A. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE. 
"When executing a search warrant, an officer must ordinarily give notice of his 
authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched." State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 
700, 701 (Utah 1988). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that this "knock-
and-announce" rule "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth 
3
 Defendant makes one reference in his brief to the Utah Constitution, referring to its 
concurrent guarantee with the Fourth Amendment that "all persons [have] the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures." Aplt. Brf. at 13. He does not, however, analyze 
the state constitutional provision, but examines the officers' search in light of Fourth 
Amendment law only. Therefore, the State addresses only defendant's Fourth Amendment 
claim. See State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, t 9, 21 P.3d 212 (refusing to address 
state constitutional provision where not adequately raised or briefed). 
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Amendment." Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995).4 As 
such, "the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law 
enforcement officers announce their presence and authority prior to entering." Id. 
The knock-and-announce rule has its origin in the common law and can be traced at 
least as far back as 1603. Id. at 931, 115 S.Ct. at 1916-17 & n.2 (citation omitted). In 
Semayne 's Case, the King's Bench held: 
The house of every one is his castle, .... 
[But] [i]n all cases where the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not 
open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other 
execution of the King's process, if he cannot otherwise enter. But he ought 
first to signify the cause of his coming, and make request to open the doors. 
. . . for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or 
breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which 
great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is 
in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, 
it is to be presumed that he would obey it. 
5Co.Rep.91a,91b,77Eng.Rep. 194,195-96 (K.B. 1603). See 2 Wayne R. LeFave, Search 
and Seizure § 4.8(a), at 661 (2004); Wilson, 514 U.S at 931-32, 115 S.Ct. at 1916-17. 
Our courts have since concluded that the basic interests served by the knock-and-
announce rule are "(1) the protection of an individual's private activities within his home, 
(2) the prevention of violence and physical injury to both police and occupants which may 
4
 Although generally referred as the "knock-and-announce" rule, a "knock" is not 
required under U.S. Supreme Court precedent or Utah law. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931,115 
S.Ct. at 1916 (referring only to a requirement that officers "announce[ ] their presence and 
authority prior to entering"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1) (West 2004) (stating that an 
officer may forcibly enter "after [giving] notice of his authority and purpose"). Defendant 
does not argue otherwise. 
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result from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting 
from forced entry." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. These interests, however, would not be served if 
officers were permitted to enter the premises simultaneously with the announcement, without 
providing the occupant "the chance to save his door." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 
41, 124 S.Ct. 521, 528 (2003). Therefore, implicit in the knock-and-announce rule is the 
requirement that "once having given the required notice, the officer 'must wait a reasonable 
period of time before he may break and enter into the premises to be searched.'" 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 672 (2004) (quoting State v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144 
(R.I. 1974)); accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1261-62 (Utah 1993). 
The Supreme Court has nevertheless cautioned that "[t]he Fourth Amendment's 
flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of 
announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 
934,115 S.Ct. at 1918. Accordingly, police are not required to comply with the knock-and-
announce rule if "under the particular circumstances, [it] would be dangerous or futile, or 
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence." Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421 
(1997). 
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B. HAVING ANNOUNCED THEIR PURPOSE FACE-TO-FACE, THE OFFICERS5 
REASONABLY ENTERED THROUGH THE DOOR OPENED BY DEFENDANT'S 
WIFE . 
No one disputes that Detectives Teerlink and Cutler announced their authority and 
purpose when executing the search warrant. Instead, the appeal turns on whether they failed 
to wait a reasonable time before they entered, rendering the search unreasonable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that determining "[t]he interval of time an officer 
must wait between announcement and entry depends on the circumstances of each case." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1261 (quotations and citation omitted). And in making that 
determination, the Court should measure the facts against the interests served by the knock-
and-announce rule. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 
1735 (1967) (holding that reasonableness of inspection of the building is measured against 
"the invasion which the search entails"). 
In United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia concluded that further delay does not serve the objectives of the 
knock-and-announce rule after the door has been opened and announcement made. There, an 
officer knocked on Kemp's front door to execute a search warrant. Id. at 1141. Because the 
door was not securely shut, it swung open when the officer knocked. Id. When the door 
opened, the officer saw Kemp and two others sitting in the living room watching television. 
Id. The officer identified himself, announced his purpose, and without further delay entered 
the apartment to execute the warrant. Id. 
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In upholding the search, the Circuit Court observed that "[w]hen an officer knocks at 
a door that is and remains closed, it is not immediately clear whether the occupants are about 
to open the door" and the officer is thus required to wait for a period of time "before 
inferring that he is being refused admission and proceeding forcibly to break in." Id. at 
1142. But, the court explained, a different situation is presented "[w]hen an officer knocks 
on a closed door only to find himself looking at an occupant of the apartment through an 
open door." Id. The occupant is then aware of the officer's presence and purpose. Id. The 
court concluded that "[i]nasmuch as the occupant then has no right to refuse the officer 
admission, no interest served by the knock and announce statute would be furthered by 
requiring the officer to stand at the open doorway for [a period of time] in order to determine 
whether the occupant means to admit him." Id. 
Kemp's rationale has been cited with approval by LaFave and other courts. See 2 
Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 676 (2004) (citing Kemp favorably for the 
proposition that "no wait is necessary when the officer has given the notice to an occupant 
face-to-face through an open door"); United States v. Hardin, 106 Fed.Appx. 442, 444-46, 
2004 WL 1987143, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,2004) (holding that officers were not required to 
pause for clarification before opening storm door where occupant stepped back a few steps 
10 
upon officers' announcement of their authority and purpose);5 Adcock v. Commonwealth, 
967 S.W.2d 6,11 (Ky. 1998) (concluding that objectives of knock-and-announce rule are not 
advanced by waiting until admission is denied once occupant opens door and officer 
announces authority and purpose); State v. Richards, 962 P.2d 118 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) 
(holding that "waiting would have served none of the purposes of the 'knock and wait' rule" 
after officer gained defendant's attention through open door and announced his authority and 
purpose). 
In this case, Barnett pushed open the storm door, stood in the doorway, and talked to 
Detectives Teerlink and Cutler. R. 129: 10-11. After a brief exchange about Barnett's lost 
dog, the officers identified themselves and announced their purpose, whereupon Barnett took 
a step back. R. 129: 6, 12-13, 17, 19 (R. 72: f 4). At this point, all of the objectives of the 
knock-and-announce rule had been achieved. No reason remained for further delay. Indeed, 
such delay would have been futile. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. at 1421 
(holding that compliance with knock and announce rule not required if "under the particular 
circumstances, [it] would be . . . futile"). 
5
 Hardin was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. However, under the 
rules of the Sixth Circuit, such an unpublished opinion may be cited if "the party believes 
. . . that [it] has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case, and that there is no 
published opinion that would serve as well " 6th Cir. R. 28(g). Although Hardin is only 
cited for its persuasive value here, it represents the only authority in the Sixth Circuit on the 
precise issue presented in this appeal. A copy of the opinion is set forth in Addendum B. 
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1. The Face-to-Face Announcement Through the Open Door 
Safeguarded Defendant's Right to Privacy. 
As noted, the first interest served by the knock-and-announce rule is "the protection of 
an individual's private activities within his home." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. Defendant 
contends that "the police violated [his] privacy interests by entering his home, grabbing his 
wife, and storming the house with over ten officers, including a heavily armed SWAT team." 
Aplt. Brf. at 29. But where a warrant has been issued, an occupant's right of privacy is 
necessarily limited to begin with. "The simple fact is that a homeowner has no right to 
prevent officers armed with a warrant . . . from entering his home." United States v. 
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4,11 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S 970,94 S.Ct 1993 
(1974). 
Still, an unannounced entry exposes activities that occupants of a home traditionally 
and rightfully seek to preserve as private. The requirement that officers wait a reasonable 
period of time after announcing their authority and purpose gives persons inside an 
"opportunity to prepare themselves for such an entry." Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5, 117 
S.Ct. at 1421 n.5; accord United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4,12 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(noting that knock-and-announce rule helps "prevent embarrassing circumstances resulting 
from the unexpected exposure of private activities"), cert, denied, 416 U.S 970, 94 S.Ct. 
1993 (1974). 
A knock at the door alerts occupants that someone from outside seeks their audience 
within and their response at the door diminishes, if not eliminates, the risk that private 
activities will be exposed. Therefore, where the occupant opens the door in response to 
12 
someone's call outside, as here, the rule's purpose in maintaining the privacy of occupants is 
realized. As observed in Kemp, the respect for an individual's privacy in his or her home 
"would only be mocked by requiring the officer to wait on the doorstep, staring at the 
occupant, for some length of time until the occupant could be understood constructively to 
have refused him the entry to which he is entitled." Kemp, 12 F.3d at 277. 
2. The Face-to-Face Announcement Through the Open Door 
Prevented the Violence That May Result from a Surprise Entry. 
The second interest served by the knock-and-announce rule is "the prevention of 
violence and physical injury to both police and occupants which may result from an 
unannounced police entry." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. The concern here is that officers who 
enter a residence unannounced might be mistaken for intruders, prompting a defensive and 
violent response from the occupants within. See United States v. Miller, 357 U.S. 301,313-
14 n.12, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1198 n. 12 (1958) (observing that officers entering unannounced 
"might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot down by a fearful householder"); accord State 
v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 415 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Miller for same proposition). By 
identifying themselves and announcing their purpose, as here, officers eliminate the surprise 
which creates that possibility. 
Defendant argues, however, that "the police officers' failure to wait resulted in one of 
the very evils that the knock-and-announce rule seeks to avoid, namely, violence." Aplt. Brf. 
at 30. But as explained in Kemp, "when the police and the occupant of a dwelling face each 
other through an open doorway and the police announce their purpose before entering, any 
violence that might ensue between the occupant and the officers is not attributable to surprise 
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and is not likely to be averted by the police standing around" waiting for the occupant to 
decide whether or not to grant admission. Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142; accord Hardin, 2004 WL 
1987143, at *4 (holding that "the officers did not offend the policies underlying the knock-
and-announce rule when they failed to pause for clarification"). Defendant's claim that the 
officers' entry "appears to have shocked [him], thus, instinctively causing him to protect his 
wife," Aplt. Brf. at 30, is disingenuous. He concedes that the officers announced their 
authority and purpose. He therefore had no reason to be shocked at their entry. 
Nor did defendant have any reason to be shocked at the officer's decision to secure his 
wife. The law is well settled that police may secure the occupants of a home in executing a 
search warrant for contraband, as they did here. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 
705,101 S.Ct. 2587,2595 (1981) (holding that "a warrant to search for contraband founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of 
the premises while a proper search is conducted"). Defendant has not argued otherwise. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Summers held that police may "routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation," whether or not there is any articulable danger to 
police. Id. at 702,101 S.Ct. at 2594. In so holding, the Court recognized that "the execution 
of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden 
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence." Id. Barnett's resistance, followed 
by defendant's, demonstrates that risk. Thus, rather than supporting defendant's claim that 
the officers should have waited for permission to enter, his wife's resistance after 
announcement reinforces the wisdom in the Summers holding that police may reasonably and 
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"routinely" detain the occupants of a home to prevent "sudden violence or frantic efforts to 
conceal or destroy evidence." Id. 
Additionally, and contrary to defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 17, Barnett's step back 
into the house after the officers announced their authority and purpose did raise a suspicion 
that she might attempt to conceal or destroy drugs or secure a weapon. Defendant cites 
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that a step 
backwards "offer[ed] no threat" of danger to the officers. Aplt. Brf. at 17. Rideau, however, 
explained that steps backwards "offer no threat" if they are "[stripped from their context." 
Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1575. However, the court held that such steps backwards "become very 
significant in the matrix of the general facts" and "may be construed as more or less hostile 
depending on the setting in which they occur." Id. 
In this case, Barnett's step back was taken in response to the officers' announcement 
of their authority and purpose to execute a search warrant. When viewed in this context, 
where there is an inherent risk of "sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence," a trained officer reasonably "may perceive danger where an untrained observer 
would not." Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1575. 
Defendant cites United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1981), in support of his 
claim that Barnett's step back from the door did not represent a risk to the officers. Aplt. 
Brf. at 20-21. As noted, however, Summers holds that evidence of a particular risk is not 
required before police are allowed to secure the occupants of a home being searched. 452 
U.S. at 702, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. 
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In any event, Clay is different factually and does not apply. The officers in Clay 
lawfully entered a house pursuant to a search warrant. Clay, 640 F.2d at 158. During their 
search, Clay, a visitor, approached the house and knocked on the storm door. Id. When an 
officer answered the door and ordered Clay inside, Clay stepped backwards. Id. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the detention and frisk violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the search warrant did "not [give police authority] to search anyone that 
came to the door during the time of the search." Id. at 160. The court held that police may 
stop and frisk such visitors only if the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 
1868 (1968), are satisfied. Clay, 640 F.2d at 159-62. Where "[n]othing in the record 
. . . established] a nexus between the contraband discovered inside the house and [Clay] at 
the time he was stopped and frisked," his step backwards did not create a suspicion that Clay 
was tied to the criminal activity or dangerous. Id. at 161-62. 
Unlike Clay, Barnett was not a visitor who approached the residence and knocked on 
the door. She was defendant's wife and an occupant of the house. As such, police could 
detain her in executing the warrant. 
3. The Face-to-Face Announcement Through the Open Door 
Prevented Property Damage Resulting from a Forced Entry. 
The third interest served by the knock-and-announce rule is "the prevention of 
property damage resulting from forced entry." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. It "give[s] a person 
inside the chance to save his door." Banks, 540 U.S. at 41,124 S.Ct. at 528. Where, as here, 
the occupant has opened the door and has been made aware of the officers' identity and 
purpose, damage to the door created by a forced entry is no longer a concern. See Kemp, 12 
16 
F.3d at 1142 (holding that the interest in unnecessary destruction of property is not 
implicated when the door is open). 
Defendant nevertheless characterizes the entry as a "forcible entry." Aplt. Brf. at 30. 
It was not. As observed by this Court more than a decade ago, "the act of pushing [an] 
already open door is not the type of forcible entry, such as breaking down a door, with which 
courts are customarily concerned in search and seizure cases." City of Or em v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1392 (Utah App. 1994). Indeed, the majority of federal circuit courts addressing 
the federal knock-and-announce statute have held that there is no "breaking" where the door 
is open. See United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730,732-33 (10th Cir. 1985) (following "the 
majority rule [ ] that entry through an open door is not a 'breaking' within the meaning of the 
federal knock and announce statute"). 
In sum, once Barnett opened the door and the detectives announced their authority 
and purpose, the objectives of the knock-and-announce rule were achieved and there was no 
need for further delay. Indeed, further delay would have been futile. See Richards, 520 U.S. 
at 394, 117 S.Ct. at 1421 (holding that police are not required to comply with knock-and-
announce rule if "under the particular circumstances, [it] would be. . . futile"). Thus, even if 
Barnett's step backward "meant that she was allowing the officers inside the apartment" as 
defendant argues, Aplt. Brf. at 17, 31, "the officers were entitled to enter the residence, and 
therefore, 'no interest served by the knock and announce rule would be furthered by 
requiring the officers to stand at the [ ] doorway for [additional time] in order to determine 
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whether the occupant mean[t] to admit him.'" Hardin, 2004 WL 1987143, at *3 (quoting 
Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142) (brackets supplied in Hardin). 
The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that "[t]he detectives complied with the 
knock-and-announce provision of the search warrant." R. 73. And contrary to defendant's 
claim, further delay could only have increased the risk of violence or property damage by 
giving the occupants inside an opportunity to resist.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
6
 The cases upon which defendant relies are inapposite. See, e.g., Ribe, 876 P.2d at 
404 (officer announced his authority and purpose as he entered the apartment, "without 
waiting for someone to answer the door"); Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Ark. 
1999) (officers broke down door with battering ram after waiting only two or three seconds 
without an answer); Park v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 172 (Va. App. 2000) (police rushed 
into apartment while simultaneously announcing their authority and purpose); Heaton v. 
Commonwealth, 207 S.E.2d 829 (Va. 1974) (officers broke down door first and then 
announced their authority and purpose); People v. Martinez, N.E.2d 607 (111. App. 1987) 
(officers' entry was simultaneous with announcement), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); 
State v. Ellis, 584 P.2d 428 (Wash. 1978) (officers entered before announcing their authority 
and purpose); Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 176 (Va. App. 1995) (officers entered 
after waiting only two or three seconds without an answer). 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PETE FLOOR, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 03T9US056 W ^ ^ ^ f 
Hon. Dennis M. Fuchs 
This matter came on for Suppression Hearing on May 27, 2004, before the Honorable 
Dennis M. Fuchs. The State was represented by Blake Hills. Defendant was represented by 
Ralph Dellapiana, for LDA. 
Based upon the testimony of Detective Doug Teerlink, Detective Steve Cutler, and 
Detective Michael Burbank, as well as the arguments of counsel, the Court finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On November 11, 2003, the Salt Lake City Police Department Narcotics Squad 
executed a "knock and announce" search warrant at 179 North K Street in Salt 
Lake County. 
2. Detectives Teerlink and Cutler approached the front door of the residence while 
Detective Burbank and the rest of the entry team waited in the driveway. 
When Detectives Teerlink and Cutler approached the front door, they observed 
that it was already open. A female occupant of the residence, Connie Bamett, saw 
the detectives and came to the front door. Bamett opened the screen door and 
initiated a conversation with Detectives Teerlink and Cutler. 
After a brief conversation, Detective Cutler showed his police badge as Detective 
Teerlink announced, "Police serving a search warrant." Bamett responded by 
attempting to retreat into the residence. Detective Teerlink, who was still outside, 
grabbed Bamett's arm to keep her from retreating into the residence. Defendant 
then grabbed Bamett around the waist with both arms and pulled Barnett and 
Detective Teerlink into the residence. 
Detective Cutler had grabbed Detective Teerlink in an effort to prevent him from 
being pulled into the residence, but the attempt was unsuccessful. 
When Bamett attempted to retreat into the residence and Defendant forcibly 
pulled her into the residence, Detectives Teerlink and Cutler believed that the 
occupants of the residence would not comply with peaceable entry by law 
enforcement. The detectives were concerned that if the occupants were allowed to 
fully retreat to unseen areas of the residence, the occupants could destroy the 
drugs that were being sought pursuant to the warrant or they could retrieve 
weapons and endanger officer safety. 
When Detective Burbank heard Detective Teerlink announce, "Police serving a 
search warrant," he moved the entry team into position by the front door. When 
he did so, Detective Burbank saw Detective Teerlink involved in a struggle with 
Bamett and Defendant. Detective Burbank announced, "Police, police, police," 
and then entered the residence. Upon entering the residence, Detective Burbank 
was bitten by a dog. 
No property was damaged during law enforcement's entry into the residence. 
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Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The detectives complied with the "knock and announce" provision of the search 
warrant when Detective Cutler showed his police badge while Detective Teerlink 
announced, "Police serving a search warrant." Knocking on the door would have 
been a useless gesture because the door was already open and an occupant of the 
residence had come to the door to initiate conversation with the detectives. 
2. Based upon Barnett's action of attempting to retreat into the residence and 
Defendant's action of forcibly pulling her into the residence, the detectives were 
justified in their belief that the occupants of the residence would not comply with 
peaceful entry by law enforcement. 
3. Detective Teerlink's initial entry into the home was due solely to the action of 
Defendant pulling Barnett and therefore, Teerlink, into the residence. 
4. Exigent circumstances allowing entry into the residence arose when Barnett and 
Defendant retreated into the residence. Police officers are not required to allow 
occupants of a residence to retreat to unseen areas and then wait to see if the 
occupants come back to allow the officers in. The detectives did not have to wait 
for their lives to be placed in danger before responding to the actions of Barnett 
and Defendant. 
5. Detective Burbank and the entry team only entered the residence after viewing the 
struggle between Detective Teerlink and Barnett and Defendant. It would have 
been irresponsible for the entry team to remain outside when they could see a 
fellow officer involved in a physical struggle inside. 
6. Based on the actions of Barnett and Defendant, the detectives were not required 
by either the Fourth Amendment or Utah's "knock and announce" statute to wait 
any longer before entering the residence. 
3 
7. The determination of whether the execution of a warrant was reasonable is a fact 
sensitive one. Under the particular facts of this case, the execution of the warrant 
and the subsequent search were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and 
Utah's "knock and announce" statute. 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's motion to Suppress is denied and all evidence obtained in this case is 
admissible at trial. 
DATED this _ 2 L day of /^<^C<^ , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order was delivered to Ralph Dellapiana, Legal Defender's Association 
of Salt Lake by mail, hand delivery and/or via facsimile on _ J (//?<£ 3 2004. 
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United States v. Hardin, 106 Fed.Appx. 442, 2004 WL 1987143 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2004) 
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. 
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 
Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g) limits citation to specific situations. Please see Rule 28(g) before citing in a proceeding in 
a court in the Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be served on other parties and the Court. 
Please use FIND to look at the applicable circuit court rule before citing this opinion. Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g). 
(FIND CTA6 Rule 28.) 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Terry Eugene HARDIN, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 03-6093. 
Sept. 1, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
United States District Court for the Western District 
of Tennessee, James Dale Todd, Chief Judge, on a 
guilty plea to being a convicted felon in possession of 
a firearm, and he appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit 
Judge, held that police officers executing search 
warrant did not violate the knock-and-announce rule. « 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Searches and Seizures € ^ 1 4 3 . 1 
349kl43.1 Most Cited Cases 
Police officers acted reasonably in executing a search 
warrant, and hence, did not violate the knock-and-
announce rule, despite claim that the officers did not 
give the occupants of the subject residence a 
reasonable opportunity to open the door; officers 
alerted defendant and the other occupants of the 
residence to their identity and purpose by yelling, 
"Police. Search warrant," defendant responded by 
retreating a few steps, a move indicating that he was 
either permitting the officers entry or denying the 
officers entry, and in either case, the officers were 
entitled to enter the residence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[2] Searches and Seizures € ^ 1 4 3 . 1 
349kl43.1 Most Cited Cases 
Despite its title, the knock-and-announce rule does 
not require a knock; rather, an announcement of the 
officer's identity and purpose suffices. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
*442 On Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee. 
Jerry R. Kitchen, Asst. U.S. Attorney, U.S. 
Attorney's Office, Jackson, TN, for Plaintiff-
Appellee. 
M. Dianne Smothers, Asst. FP Defender, Office of 
the Federal Public Defender for the Western District 
of Tennessee, Memphis, TN, for Defendant-
Appellant. 
Before: KEITH, MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit 
Judges. 
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. 
**1 The "knock-and-announce" rule requires law 
enforcement officers to announce their presence and 
authority before entering a residence to execute a 
warrant. Terry Hardin, the defendant-appellant, 
claims that officers violated this rule when they 
executed a warrant at his residence by failing to 
afford the occupants a reasonable time to open the 
door before entering. Because the officers acted 
reasonably in executing the warrant, and hence did 
not violate the knock-and-announce rule, we affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 13, 2002, Sergeant Matthew 
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Hardaway of the City of Jackson Police Department 
obtained a warrant to search Hardin's residence in 
Jackson, Tennessee, *443 for marijuana and related 
materials. In his supporting affidavit, Hardaway 
stated that a reliable confidential informant had 
observed marijuana on the premises within the past 
seventy-two hours and that Hardin had been arrested 
for violent and narcotics-related crimes in the past. 
Though this information was not included in the 
affidavit, the informant had made a controlled buy 
and had advised Hardaway of "counter-surveillance" 
and "a possibility of weapons and dogs on the 
premises." 
About seven officers executed the warrant. They 
drove a van to the front of the residence and parked 
roughly twenty-five to thirty feet from the front door. 
The officers, led by Deputy Mark Byrum of the 
Madison County Sheriffs Department, exited the van 
and approached the house at "a fast-paced walk." The 
officers wore body armor, riot gear, and helmets, and 
police decals were visible on the front and rear of 
their uniforms. Sherika Long, the fifteen-year-old 
daughter of Sharon Long, one of the suspects, 
watched the van pull up in front of the residence from 
the doorway, and the officers noticed Sherika as they 
exited the van. According to their testimony, the 
officers shouted "Police. Search warrant" as they 
approached the house. Sherika stepped back from the 
doorway as the officers neared and did not open the 
external storm door for the officers. Detective 
Byrum opened the door and entered the house 
without pausing or knocking. The officers located 
Hardin and Sharon Long in the master bedroom and 
found a pistol in the dresser drawer. 
A grand jury indicted Hardin on a single count of 
being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Hardin moved to 
suppress the pistol and other evidence obtained from 
the search of the residence, arguing that (1) the 
search warrant was invalid for a lack of probable 
cause, and (2) the officers violated the knock-and-
announce rule in executing the warrant. 
At the suppression hearing, Byrum testified about 
the officers' execution of the warrant. According to 
Byrum, the front door of the residence was open, but 
the storm door was closed. As the van pulled up in 
front of the residence, Byrum noticed Sherika Long 
come to the front door and watch the van park. After 
Byrum exited the van, he called, "Police. Search 
warrant" very loudly, "once prior to crossing the 
i^Or. Sept. 1,2004) 
threshold, then two to three times upon actually 
entering the residence." He estimated that it took him 
"at least four to five seconds" to reach the front door 
from the van. As Byrum stepped up onto the front 
porch, Long "backed away from the door. She 
stepped in and [it] would have been slightly to [her] 
left about three to four steps and stood there." Byrum 
"was unsure if she was notifying other people of 
[their] presence or just simply stepping back to let 
[them] in or what." "[F]eeling a need to get inside 
quickly," Byrum opened the storm door without 
knocking and entered the residence. 
**2 Sherika Long also testified about the execution 
of the warrant. According to Long, she was watching 
television when she "thought [she] heard some 
tapping on the door." She opened the front door and 
the screen door and stuck her head outside, but she 
did not see anything. She closed the screen door, but 
she remained at the doorway and, about five minutes 
later, saw the van pull up in front of the residence. 
She observed the officers exit the van, and she knew 
they were police. She heard them yelling "Get down 
on the ground" as they approached the door, and she 
backed up "about three or four" feet rather than 
letting the officers in the door. According to Long, 
she had dropped to the *444 ground by the time the 
officers entered the residence. 
In denying Hardin's motion to suppress, the district 
court held that the officers had not violated the 
knock-and-announce rule. [FN1] The court credited 
Byrum's testimony over Long's testimony and found 
that the officers had shouted, "Police. Search 
warrant" prior to entering the residence. The court 
determined that the officers acted reasonably in 
entering the residence because, in backing away from 
the door, Long was either refusing the officers' entry 
or consenting to the officers' entry and, in either case, 
the officers were entitled to enter. "It would have 
been a useless gesture," the court concluded, "for the 
officer to have knocked on the door and then waited 
to see what Ms. Long was going to do." The court 
also found that there were no exigent circumstances 
to justify entry. 
FN1. The district court also found that there 
was probable cause for the issuance of the 
warrant. Hardin does not challenge that 
ruling on appeal. 
Hardin then pled guilty to the charged crime, 
reserving his right to appeal the district court's ruling 
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on the suppression motion. Hardin timely appealed. 
ANALYSIS 
[1] The district court properly concluded that the 
officers did not violate the knock-and-announce rule 
in executing the warrant at Hardin's residence. In 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this 
court applies the de novo standard to the district 
court's legal conclusions and the clear error standard 
to the district court's findings of fact. United States v. 
Spikes, 158F.3d913, 922(6thCir.l998). The court 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Government. Id. "The ultimate question of 
whether the search or seizure is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment remains subject to de novo 
review." Id. at 922-23. 
"Absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment requires the police to knock and 
announce their presence before forcibly entering a 
location to execute a search warrant." United States 
v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir.2002). 
"[T]his common law 'knock and announce' principle 
forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment." Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 
927, 929, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). 
"The knock-and-announce rule protects several 
important interests, including 1) reducing the 
potential for violence to both the police officers and 
the occupants of the house into which entry is sought; 
2) curbing the needless destruction of private 
property; and 3) protecting the individual's right to 
privacy in his or her house." United States v. Dice, 
200 F.3d 978, 982 (6th Cir.2000). "To protect these 
interests, evidence procured 'ensuing' the execution 
of a warrant which lacked a proper knock and 
announcement is inadmissible." Id. 
**3 "An integral part of the knock-and-announce 
rule is the requirement that officers wait a 
'reasonable' period of time after a knock before 
physically forcing their way into a residence," so that 
the resident has the opportunity to allow peaceable 
entry. Id. at 983. This court has declined to adopt a 
bright-line rule for the amount of time that officers 
must wait before entry, observing that "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment's 'knock and announce' principle, given 
its fact-sensitive nature, cannot be distilled into a 
constitutional stop-watch where a fraction of a 
second assumes controlling significance." Spikes, 
158 F.3d at 926. "Whether police officers paused 
long enough before admitting themselves into a home 
thus entails a highly contextual analysis, requiring 
^Cir. Sept. 1,2004) 
examination of all the circumstances *445 of the 
case." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). Important factors include the object of the 
search, possible defensive measures taken by 
residents of the dwelling, the time of day, and the 
method of announcement. United States v. Pinson, 
321 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir.2003). 
Hardin argues that the officers did not give the 
occupants of Hardin's residence a reasonable 
opportunity to open the door. He stresses that Long 
did not expressly refuse admittance to the officers 
and that the district court did not find that Long had 
constructively refused admittance to the officers. 
Apparently, Hardin believes that, under the knock-
and-announce rule, the officers were required to 
pause at the doorway and wait for Long to clarify 
whether she was refusing or permitting entrance. 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment questions only whether 
the officers' overall actions were reasonable, not how 
much time officers must wait to infer a constructive 
refusal of admittance," id. at 568, and the conduct of 
the officers easily meets this standard of 
reasonableness. The officers alerted Long and the 
other occupants of the residence to their identity and 
purpose by yelling, "Police. Search warrant." Long 
responded by retreating a few steps, a move 
indicating that Long was either permitting the 
officers entry or denying the officers entry. As the 
district court observed, in either case, the officers 
were entitled to enter the residence, and therefore "no 
interest served by the knock and announce rule would 
be furthered by requiring the officers to stand at the [ 
] doorway for [additional time] in order to determine 
whether the occupant meanft] to admit him." United 
States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140, 1142 (D.C.Cir.1994); 
cf. State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361, 962 P.2d 
118, 125 (Wash. 1998). 
The possibility of defensive measures and Hardin's 
background bolster the reasonableness of the officers' 
action. Pinson, 321 F.3d at 566-67; Spikes, 158 F.3d 
at 926. The officers knew that Hardin had been 
arrested in the past for narcotics and weapons 
violations and had a lengthy criminal history. 
Additionally, the confidential informant had advised 
the officers of counter-surveillance and a possibility 
of weapons and dogs on the premises. Given these 
circumstances, the officers acted reasonably in not 
tarrying on the porch. 
**4 Finally, the officers did not offend the policies 
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underlying the knock-and-announce rule when they 
failed to pause for clarification from Long before 
entering the residence. First, "when the police and 
the occupant of a dwelling face each other [ ] and the 
police announce their purpose before entering, any 
violence that might ensue between the occupant and 
the officers is not attributable to surprise and is not 
likely to be averted by the police standing around [for 
some period of time]." Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142. 
Second, the officer did not need to destroy any 
property in entering the residence. Third, "[wjhile 
respect for the individual's privacy in [her] home-
qualified by the imminent execution of a valid search 
warrant—is well served by requiring the officer to 
knock and announce his authority and purpose, such 
respect would only be mocked by requiring the 
officer to wait on the doorstep, staring at the 
occupant, for some length of time." Id. 
[2] Hardin also complains that the officers did not 
knock before entering the residence. Despite its title, 
however, the knock-and-announce rule does not 
require a knock; rather, an announcement of the 
officer's identity and purpose suffices. Spikes, 158 
F.3d at 925; United States v. Smith, 63 F.3d 956, 962 
(10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds by 516 
U.S. *446 1105, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 
(1996). The rule focuses "not on what 'magic words' 
are spoken by the police, or whether the police rang 
the doorbell." Spikes, 158 F.3d at 925 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Rather, it mandates only 
that the occupant "know who is entering, why he is 
entering, and be given a reasonable opportunity to 
surrender his privacy voluntarily." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and punctuation omitted). The 
announcement made by the officers—"Police. Search 
warrant"—provided adequate notice to Long and the 
other occupants of Hardin's residence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the 
judgment of the district court. 
106 Fed.Appx. 442, 2004 WL 1987143 (6th 
Cir.(Tenn.)) 
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